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Note
Unexpected Consequences: The Constitutional
Implications of Federal Prison Policy for
Offenders Considering Abortion
Claire Deason∗
Leisa Gibson robbed a bank.1 Before she was sentenced,
Leisa wrote to both her public defender and sentencing judge;
she told them she was pregnant and wanted an abortion.2 She
was between 13 and 14 weeks pregnant at the time.3 Leisa’s
pregnancy continued while she awaited sentencing despite her
notice to her lawyer and the judge.4 She continued her requests
for an abortion. “She made repeated requests of virtually everyone that she came in contact with for assistance in carrying
out the abortion, but was thwarted at every turn.”5 Four
months passed; Leisa was sentenced and transferred to federal
prison.6 After being moved to various prisons over several
weeks, Leisa arrived at a prison in Lexington, Kentucky, where
she was told her abortion would be performed.7 However, Leisa
missed her clinic appointment because she was not told that it
had been scheduled. After pleading with prison administrators,
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for her thoughtful advice, careful reading, and commitment to women’s causes,
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improved this Note from earlier drafts. The author is grateful to her fiancé
Mike Madigan for his patience and tireless listening. She is eminently proud
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1. Gibson v. Matthews, 926 F.2d 532, 533 (6th Cir. 1991).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 534.
7. Id.
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including medical staff, a prison chaplain, a prison psychiatrist,
and several United States Marshals, Leisa was turned away
once and for all by the Lexington prison’s medical staff.8 By
then she was 23–24 weeks pregnant.9 She gave birth in prison.10 Leisa is not alone.11 Offenders12 like her face bureaucratic
obstacles to their access to abortion,13 though they retain it as a
constitutional right.14
The right to abortion in prison is diluted by Bureau of
Prisons (BOP) policies which burden its exercise. These policies
require potentially coercive counseling, empower prison administrators to control the process, without regard for the time
constraints associated with pregnancy.15 These policies govern
all U.S. federal prisons like those in which Leisa was incarcerated.
When Leisa ultimately sued the prison administrators
from whom she requested assistance, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals ruled against her.16 They stated that, although it may
appear that Leisa was a “victim of the bureaucracy as a
whole,”17 no individual prison staff members could be held lia8. Id. at 534–35.
9. Id. at 535.
10. Id.
11. The female prison population is increasing at astounding rates. See
CORR. ASS’N OF N.Y., WOMEN IN PRISON FACT SHEET (2008), available at
http://www.correctionalassociation.org/publications/download/wipp/factsheets/
Women_in_Prison_Fact_Sheet_2008.pdf [hereinafter FACT SHEET] (noting a
64% increase in the state and federal female prison population from 1995 to
2006). The majority of the surveys and case studies cited herein derive from
federal prisons alone. Where solely federal data is unavailable, I supplement
demographics cited in this Note with statistics about state prisons or state and
federal prisons combined.
12. I use the term “offenders” in reference to those individuals incarcerated in the prison system.
13. See, e.g., Roe v. Crawford, 514 F.3d 789, 792–93 (8th Cir. 2008) (describing a female prisoner’s attempt to obtain an abortion which was ultimately impeded by prison policies and bureaucracy).
14. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987) (“Prison walls do not form a
barrier separating prison inmates from the protections of the Constitution.”).
15. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NO.
P5360.09, PROGRAM STATEMENT, RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND PRACTICES (2004),
available at http://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5360_009.pdf [hereinafter RELIGION POLICY]; FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NO.
6070.05, PROGRAM STATEMENT, BIRTH CONTROL, PREGNANCY, CHILD PLACEMENT AND ABORTION (1996), available at http://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/
6070_005.pdf [hereinafter ABORTION AND PREGNANCY POLICY].
16. Gibson v. Matthews, 926 F.2d 532, 538 (6th Cir. 1991).
17. Id. at 534–35.
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ble because prison policy placed the responsibility of obtaining
an abortion with the incarcerated woman18 and no law existed
at the time that obliged prison staff to help Leisa.19 The law
has developed since Leisa’s case,20 but prison procedures continue to jeopardize the rights of female prisoners.
This Note argues that, although the federal prison policies
governing abortion are facially constitutional and will therefore
survive substantive challenges like Leisa’s,21 these policies are
unconstitutional as applied because they deny pregnant offenders the constitutionally protected procedures that should accompany the right to terminate a pregnancy. Part I of this Note
explains the BOP abortion policies, outlines the state of prison
abortion law, and describes the procedural due process protections courts require for offenders. Part II discusses the loopholes and roadblocks that, nevertheless, prevent incarcerated
women from getting timely abortions. The discussion shows
that, as applied, the BOP policies violate the Constitution’s
guarantee of procedural due process. Part III describes the procedural changes necessary to bring the application of BOP policy into conformity with the Constitution. A simple, albeit surprising, analogy to prison correspondence policies can provide a
roadmap for establishing the basic protections of notice and a
hearing. Part III concludes that, without a change in the application of BOP policy, procedural due process violations, and experiences like Leisa’s, are likely to increase with the rise in the
female offender population.

18. Id. at 537–38.
19. Id. at 535–36 (citing Monmouth County Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326 (3d Cir. 1987) (indicating that Monmouth County, which, according to the Gibson court, “implicitly extended to prisoners a right not to be
prevented from having an abortion because of their incarcerated status,” had
not been decided when prison staff prevented Leisa’s abortion).
20. See, e.g., Monmouth County, 834 F.2d at 326.
21. See Gibson, 926 F.2d at 535–38. (reviewing a challenge to federal prison policy under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Fifth, Eighth,
and Ninth Amendments). Although Leisa was subject to the same policies critiqued in this Note, she brought suit against individual prison staff members
in their official capacity through 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. This Note focuses on a
critique of the policy itself, as Gibson demonstrates that § 1983 suits against
prison staff members neither compensate offenders nor correct policy failures.
See id.
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I. THE CURRENT STATE OF PRISONS AND PRISONERS’
RIGHTS
Over 1,300,000 women were in federal or state prison, on
parole or probation in the United States in 2006.22 Women
comprise over 7% of the total prison population.23 Compared to
the male prison population, this percentage represents a drastic increase.24 From 1995 to 2005, the number of incarcerated
women rose by 57% while the population of incarcerated men
rose by only 34%.25 This rapidly growing demographic of female
offenders faces distinct health challenges.
A. PREGNANCIES IN PRISON
Pregnancy rates in prison are rarely calculated. The few
reported results vary even when studies are conducted.26 Some
survey the combined female population of state and federal
prisoners,27 while others survey only particular race or age
groups.28 In addition, many studies fail to report data on pregnancy-related health care.29 All of the available statistics derive
22. FACT SHEET, supra note 11.
23. Id.
24. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ
198272, CENSUS OF STATE AND FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES 1 (2000),
available at http://www.ojp.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/csfcf00.pdf (stating that, between
1995 and 2000, the population of incarcerated women rose by 38% while that
of incarcerated men rose by 27%).
25. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 215092,
PRISONERS IN 2005, at 4 (2006), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/
pdf/p05/pdf.
26. Compare BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
SPECIAL REPORT: WOMEN IN PRISON 10 (1991), available at http://www.ojp.gov/
bjs/pub/pdf/wopris.pdf [hereinafter WOMEN IN PRISON] (noting that 6.1% of
state prisoners report being pregnant at the time of admission to prison), with
THOMAS G. BLOMBERG & KAROL LUCKEN, AMERICAN PENOLOGY, A HISTORY
OF CONTROL 192–93 (2000) (describing varying statistics, i.e. 6% of women at
prison intake were reported pregnant in a 1993 study, 5% in a different study
in 1997, while a 1992 study revealed that 9% of imprisoned women gave birth
while incarcerated), and BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 221740, MEDICAL PROBLEMS OF PRISONERS 4 (2004), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/mpp.pdf [hereinafter MEDICAL PROBLEMS
OF PRISONERS] (“[Four percent] of state and 3% of federal inmates said they
were pregnant at the time of admission”).
27. E.g., MEDICAL PROBLEMS OF PRISONERS, supra note 26.
28. E.g., WOMEN IN PRISON, supra note 26.
29. MEDICAL PROBLEMS OF PRISONERS, supra note 26, tbl.10 (leaving
blank statistical reporting of pregnancy care and obstetrics examinations for
pregnant federal offenders due to “small sample size” of approximately three
percent).
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from data collected at admission.30 The most recent federal
study reported that 3% of women admitted to federal prison are
pregnant at that time.31 Other incarcerated women become
pregnant while in prison.32 Precise statistics cataloging pregnancy rates during incarceration are unavailable, however.
While studies and statistics are limited, public health officials
estimate that as many as 6,000 women are pregnant in prison
at any time in the United States.33
Despite the lack of data on prison pregnancies, anecdotal
stories regarding childbirth in prisons have drawn the attention of interest groups. News media and prisoner’s rights
groups exposed the practice of shackling women to their hospital beds while they give birth under the supervision of prison
guards.34 Interested parties, including non-profit organizations,35 private medical care providers,36 and policy makers,
30. See, e.g., id. at 1.
31. Id. tbl.10; see also Mark Egerman, Comment, Roe v. Crawford: Do Inmates Have an Eighth Amendment Right to Elective Abortions?, 31 HARV. J. L.
& GENDER 423, 424 & n.2 (2008) (describing several studies estimating that
over 6% of incarcerated women are pregnant).
32. See Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 124–25 (3d Cir. 2001) (detailing sexual abuse of inmate by guard); AMNESTY INT’L, “NOT PART OF MY
SENTENCE”: VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY 22 (1999),
available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR51/001/1999/en/
dom-AMR510011999en.html (reporting the sexual abuse of female offenders);
Editorial, Doing Something About Prison Rape, HUM. RTS. WATCH, Sept. 26,
2003, http://www.hrw.org/editorials/2003/prison092603.htm (reporting that as
many as one in four women report sexual assault by male guards in some
prisons); Nicole Summer, Powerless in Prison: Sexual Abuse Against Incarcerated Women, RH REALITY CHECK, Dec. 11, 2007, http://www
.rhrealitycheck
.org/blog/2007/12/11/powerless-in-prison-sexual-abuse-against-incarceratedwomen (sharing the story of an incarcerated woman who explains, “I am 7
months pregnant [and] I got pregnant here during a sexual assault. I have
been sexually assaulted here numerous times! The jailers here are the ones
doing it!”). See generally AMNESTY INT’L, FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS: CUSTODIAL SEXUAL MISCONDUCT, (2005), available at http://www.amnestyusa
.org/women/custody/states/federal.pdf.
33. Marian Knight & Emma Plugge, Risk Factors for Adverse Perinatal
Outcomes in Imprisoned Pregnant Women: A Systemic Review, 5 BMC PUB.
HEALTH 111 (2005).
34. Amnesty Int’l, Pregnant and Imprisoned in the United States, 27
BIRTH 266, 267–68 (2000); Adam Liptak, Prisons Often Shackle Pregnant Inmates in Labor, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2006, at A16.
35. See, e.g., Amie Newman, Pregnant Behind Bars: The Prison Doula
Project, RH REALITY CHECK, Aug. 2, 2007, http://www.rhrealitycheck.org/blog/
2007/08/02/pregnant-behind-bars-the-prison-doula-project.
36. See Correctional Medical Services, Our Mission, Vision & Values,
http://www.cmsstl.com/about-us/mission-vision-values.asp (last visited Mar. 9,
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have campaigned to ensure pre- and post-natal care for female
offenders who choose to give birth.37
Yet, abortion, a valuable option for incarcerated women, is
undefended. It is particularly suited for those who struggle
with public assistance, drug addiction, or who are at risk of losing their child to the foster system.38 Women’s access to safe
abortion in prison has not received the same attention as preand post-natal care. Without any support of the sort private organizations and prison administration provide for pregnancy
and childbirth, incarcerated women seeking abortion services
are forced to navigate prison bureaucracy alone.
Prison chaplains offer spiritual guidance during this
time.39 Faith is an important part of the lives of many incarcerated women. In fact, many women find faith while in prison.40
For many, the exercise of new-found or reawakened faith provides a support network for facing prison life.41 Faith also plays
an important role for many women in their decision to abort a
pregnancy.42 However, an increasing number of religious pro2009) (describing a private medical provider to prison populations that
“take[s] a caring and compassionate approach to serving the medical needs of
inmates and [is] committed to offering our services in a dignified, respectful
manner”). But see Leah Thayer, Hidden Hell: Women in Prison, AMNESTY
INT’L MAG., Fall 2004 (describing negative results of privatized medical services in women’s prisons, including cutting gynecological examinations as unnecessary budgetary expenses).
37. See Federal Bureau of Prisons, Female Offenders: Birth Control and
Pregnancy, http://www.bop.gov/inmate_programs/female.jsp (last visited Mar.
9, 2009) (describing the “Mothers and Infants Nurturing Together” Program, a
“community residential program” for “women who are pregnant at the time of
commitment,” offering “pre-natal and post-natal programs such as childbirth,
parenting, and coping skills classes”).
38. FACT SHEET, supra note 11; see also ABORTION AND PREGNANCY POLICY, supra note 15, at 4 (describing the responsibility of incarcerated women for
placing their newborn children in the care of social agencies); KATHRYN WATTERSON, WOMEN IN PRISON: INSIDE THE CONCRETE WOMB 216–17 (Ne. Univ.
Press 1996) (1973) (describing the experience of an incarcerated mother and
her three-year-old son being separated after a prison visit).
39. See WATTERSON, supra note 38, at 161–62 (sharing the story of Father
Charles Repole, a chaplain at the women’s jail on Riker’s Island who describes
counseling women over the years, including persuading women towards adoption over keeping custody of children).
40. See, e.g., id. at 142–46 (sharing the story of Barbara Baker, a woman
seeking religious community in prison who says, “[w]hen I talked to Reverend
McCracken, I found a people”).
41. See Samantha M. Shapiro, Jails for Jesus, MOTHER JONES, Nov.–Dec.
2003, at 55–56 (describing the community atmosphere of a faith-based prison
program meeting).
42. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 116 (1973) (“One’s philosophy . . . [and]
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gram administrators in prisons identify themselves as evangelical, or born-again, Christians.43 This faith does not recognize a
woman’s right to choose abortion.44 The BOP policies governing
abortion include a religious counseling component which could
expose pregnant women to potentially coercive counseling with
these chaplains. The BOP policies create additional bureaucratic obstacles that overshadow the benefits of spiritual counseling.
B. ABORTION POLICY OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS
Two BOP policies address incarcerated women considering
abortion.45 The “Birth Control, Pregnancy, Child Placement
and Abortion” policy was implemented to “provide[] an inmate
with medical and social services related to . . . pregnancy . . .
and abortion.”46 According to this policy, an inmate is responsible for informing the prison medical staff when she suspects
she is pregnant.47 The medical staff then informs the inmate’s
case manager when the pregnancy is confirmed.48 The offender
is then exposed to medical, religious, and social counseling to
assist her in making the decision whether to terminate her
pregnancy.49
The BOP’s religious counseling services are described in a
separate policy on religious practices.50 This policy states that
“[p]regnant inmates will be offered religious counseling to aid
in making an informed decision whether to carry the pregnancy
to full term.”51 The abortion policy does not explicitly require
one’s religious training . . . are all likely to influence and to color one’s thinking and conclusions about abortion.”); Dorie Giles Williams, Religion, Beliefs
About Human Life and the Abortion Decision, 24 REV. OF RELIGIOUS RES. 40,
45–46 (1982) (describing studies showing a correlation between theological beliefs about fetus personhood and subjects’ decisions whether to abort a pregnancy).
43. See ReligionLink, Evangelicals Expand State Prison Ministries (Jan.
5, 2004), http://www.religionlink.org/tip_040105c.php [hereinafter ReligionLink].
44. See Ben Witherington III, Why Do Evangelical Christians Believe
Abortion Is Murder?, http://www.beliefnet.com/story/72/story_7223_1.html
(last visited Mar. 9, 2009).
45. See ABORTION AND PREGNANCY POLICY, supra note 15; RELIGION POLICY, supra note 15.
46. See ABORTION AND PREGNANCY POLICY, supra note 15, at 1.
47. Id. at 2.
48. Id. at 3.
49. Id.
50. RELIGION POLICY, supra note 15, at 8.
51. Id.
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this counseling.52 However, the abortion policy could be read to
provide no alternative method for obtaining an abortion without the submission of documents by a religious counselor, effectively requiring this counseling.53 The abortion policy states
that “[t]he Warden shall ensure that each pregnant inmate is
provided . . . counseling services.”54 This mandate indicates
that counseling is likely to be the norm in cases involving abortion requests. Indeed, the policy does not explicitly provide any
way to obtain an abortion without undergoing religious counseling.55
The policy allows for counseling “for religious needs other
than those of a specific faith tradition,”56 because of the “particular needs of women.”57 In other words, an offender who is a
devout Jew may find herself discussing her choice to abort with
a Catholic priest. There is no explanation of the “particular
needs” to which the policy alludes.
All staff members, including medical and religious staff,
not wishing to facilitate abortion for the offender are exempt
from participation.58 Since this applies to all staff, the prison
chaplain is among those who may choose not to participate.59
Prison chaplains may be evangelical Christians and act as the
primary administrators of religious programming in federal
prisons.60 The evangelical influence in women’s prisons may be
attributed to the purported dominance of Christian organizations as recipients of money under the Bush Administration’s

52. ABORTION AND PREGNANCY POLICY, supra note 15, at 3.
53. ABORTION AND PREGNANCY POLICY, supra note 15.
54. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
55. Id.
56. RELIGION POLICY, supra note 15, at 8.
57. Id.
58. ABORTION AND PREGNANCY POLICY, supra note 15, at 1.
59. See id. at 1, 4.
60. See RELIGION POLICY, supra note 15, at 7. Other religiously affiliated
representatives can have access to offender populations and may represent
persuasive, and powerful political and religious perspectives on abortion. See
Emily Bazelon, Is There a Post-Abortion Syndrome?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan.
21, 2007, at 42. This article describes Rhonda Arias, an ordained “evangelical
preacher[,]” who leads the “Oil of Joy for Mourning” “abortion-recovery ministry” and counsels incarcerated women in Texas prisons, seeking to prevent future abortions, which she links to drug abuse. Id. Arias explains, “[i]n America, we have a big drug problem, and we don’t realize it’s because of abortion.”
Id. Arias conducts mock memorial services for offenders’ aborted babies, allowing women to be in the chapel for hours, share their stories, hug, and dance
with one another. Id.

2009]

PRISON ABORTION POLICY

1385

push to federally fund faith-based service organizations.61 In
addition, non-profit evangelical organizations ease budgetary
concerns in prison administration by adding to or, at times, replacing existing prison chaplain services altogether.62 For example, Prison Fellowship Ministries, an evangelical religious
programming organization, claimed to control programs for
1,843 prisons during the fiscal year of 2005 to 2006.63 These religious leaders subscribe to a programming philosophy focused
on conversion and evangelism.64 Other chaplains subscribe to
an all-inclusive philosophy that supports all denominations.65
Unfortunately, evangelical prison ministries have a growing
presence due to cuts in chaplain services.66
The institution’s chaplain is responsible for contracting
outside religious leaders to meet with offenders when the chaplain cannot personally deliver the needed religious services.67
The Federal Bureau of Prisons religious counseling policy establishes procedures for arranging such meetings.68 The policy
provides four available options to facilitate a meeting.69 The offender may request that a religious counselor come to the prison as, first, a volunteer, second, as a contractor, or third, for a
pastoral visit.70 Finally, the offender may also meet with the

61. See Megan A. Kemp, Blessed Are the Born Again: An Analysis of
Christian Fundamentalists, the Faith-Based Initiative and the Establishment
Clause, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 1523, 1540 (2007) (noting that most data demonstrates that the majority of federal funding to religious organizations goes to
Christian groups); see also ESTHER KAPLAN, WITH GOD ON THEIR SIDE: HOW
CHRISTIAN FUNDAMENTALISTS TRAMPLED SCIENCE, POLICY, AND DEMOCRACY
IN GEORGE W. BUSH’S WHITE HOUSE 40–45, 63–67 (2004).
62. See ReligionLink, supra note 43.
63. PRISON FELLOWSHIP MINISTRIES, LETTERS OF THE HEART: ANNUAL
REPORT
(2005–2006)
7
http://www.prisonfellowship.org/media/
prisonfellowship/Docs/pf/annual_reports/2005-06_Annual_Report.pdf (citing a
monthly average attendance of 121,260 offenders at its programming).
64. See, e.g., Prison Fellowship Ministries, Inside PFM, http://www
.prisonfellowship.org/contentindex.asp?ID=25.
65. See American Correctional Chaplains Association, What Are Correctional Chaplains?, http://www.correctionalchaplains.org/what_is_the_acca.htm
(“Chaplains are . . . responsible for ministry to prisoners regardless of religious
beliefs or affiliation, using outside sources for assistance when needed.”).
66. See ReligionLink, supra note 43.
67. See RELIGION POLICY, supra note 15, at 10. All contractual representatives will receive equal status and treatment, unless there are conflicts with
institutional security and order. Id.
68. Id. at 6, 10, 16.
69. Id. at 10, 16.
70. Id. at 8, 10, 16.
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chaplain of the prison for pastoral care or counseling.71 Each
option requires paperwork and possibly credential checks.72
Notably, through the approval process, the chaplain, warden,
and regional director control the amount of time that passes
until the offender receives the requested religious services and
may determine that the requested counselor cannot visit the
prison.73 If the chaplain refuses access to a requested religious
counselor, the offender is left to meet with the chaplain, who
may attempt to evangelize the prisoner, and, thus, encourage
her to continue her pregnancy.74
Once the pregnant offender meets with medical, religious
and social counselors, the involved staff members are required
to submit written documentation of the counseling sessions to
the offender’s central file.75 The offender, too, must submit a
signed written statement of her election to abort her pregnancy
and acknowledge that she had the opportunity for counseling
and information.76
Should the offender choose to terminate her pregnancy, the
abortion is scheduled by the Clinical Director and the offender
is responsible for paying for the abortion, unless the life of the
mother will be in danger if the fetus is carried to term or if the
pregnancy is a result of rape.77 BOP policy does not provide a
scheduling timeline other than the order of steps taken.78 Arranging for the abortion to take place is likely the most arduous
step of the process, however, because the number of facilities
that perform the service has been declining,79 so many areas
without abortion providers remain in the country.80 In order to
evaluate the constitutionality of these BOP policies, it is necessary to examine the development of abortion law in prisons.

71. Id. at 6.
72. Id. at 6, 10, 16.
73. See id. at 6, 8–10, 16.
74. See ReligionLink, supra note 43.
75. ABORTION AND PREGNANCY POLICY, supra note 15, at 3.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Rachel K. Jones et al., Abortion in the United States: Incidence and
Access to Services, 2005, 40 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 6, 11 (2008)
(showing that the number of abortion providers in the United States decreased
from 2,380 in 1992 to 1,787 in 2005).
80. Id. (demonstrating that in 2005, 87% of counties in the United States
did not have an abortion provider and there was a 2% decline in the total
number of abortion providers in the United States from 2000 to 2005).
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C. FEMALE OFFENDERS RETAIN A LEGAL RIGHT TO ABORTION
This Section describes abortion law as it relates to incarcerated women. The Section first addresses Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,81 the modern judicial
standard for abortion rights. It next reviews conflicting circuit
court precedent relating to abortion rights in the prison.
1. Undue Burdens on Women Seeking Abortion: Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey
The Supreme Court decided Casey in 1992, nineteen years
after Roe v. Wade established the right to an abortion.82 Since
Roe, state legislatures had established policies that effectively
limited access to abortion.83 Responding to patient frustration,
Planned Parenthood of Pennsylvania challenged several of
those policies in Casey.84
The Court’s decision created the undue burden standard
for abortion cases.85 This standard rejected legislation that
placed a “substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking
an abortion of a nonviable fetus,”86 regardless of the stage of
pregnancy. The Court applied this standard to invalidate a
spousal notification provision87 which required that a woman
seeking an abortion “sign a statement indicating that she ha[d]
notified her husband of her intended abortion.”88 The undue
burden standard presented a new way of looking at abortion:
instead of focusing on a woman’s right, as was the case in Roe,
Casey shifted the debate to one about obstacles and roadblocks.89 Obstacles and roadblocks in the prison context face
the Turner v. Safley standard of review.90
81. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
82. Id.; see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
83. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 844–45, 879–901 (analyzing several “informed consent” requirements including a twenty-four-hour waiting period,
required parental and spousal consent, as well as reporting and recordkeeping
requirements).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 874–78.
86. Id. at 877.
87. Id. at 887–98 (invalidating a spousal-notification provision in part because of possible coercion and abuse by husband, which effectively threatened
the wife’s safety and liberty to choose abortion).
88. Id. at 844.
89. Compare Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (describing the application of the right of privacy to a woman’s choice whether to have an abortion
and the detriments that would be imposed on a woman forced to carry an unwanted pregnancy), with Casey, 505 U.S. at 875 (describing the failure of Roe
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2. The Legal Standard for Prison Rights Litigation: Turner v.
Safley
The Turner v. Safley “legitimate penological interest” standard applies to challenges to prison policy within the context of
inmates’’ constitutional rights.91 Turner was a class action lawsuit brought by Missouri offenders challenging prison regulations limiting the ability of offenders to marry while in prison
and to correspond with offenders at different institutions.92 The
offenders challenged the regulations as unconstitutional, arguing that the correspondence policy and limitation on prison
marriages unconstitutionally infringed their rights.93 The
Court held the correspondence regulation to be valid and the
marriage limitations to be invalid, establishing the “legitimate
penological interest” standard for determining what constitutes
permissible infringement on the constitutional rights of the incarcerated.94 The Court explained, “when a prison regulation
impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”95
The Turner Court described four considerations for determining the legitimacy of the state’s interests.96 First, the Court
explained that there must be a “‘valid, rational connection’” between the “prison regulation and the legitimate governmental
interest put forward to justify it.”97 Next, the Court considered
“whether there are alternative means of exercising the right
that remain open to prison inmates.”98 The Court then addressed the “impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the
allocation of prison resources generally.”99 Finally, the Court
offered that the lack of alternatives demonstrated the reasonableness of the regulation and clarified that this test is not a

to acknowledge the strong state interest in fetal protection).
90. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 78 (1987) (requiring only a legitimate
penological interest when infringing on a constitutional right of a prisoner).
91. Id. at 89.
92. Id. at 81–82.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 89, 91, 99–100.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 89–90.
97. Id. at 89 (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984)).
98. Id. at 90.
99. Id.
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“least restrictive alternative” test.100 This means that prison
administration need not consider all available options and
choose that which most allows the offender to exercise her constitutional right.101 The Turner Court validated the challenged
correspondence policy,102 but it struck down the prison marriage policy as having no reasonable relationship to a legitimate penological interest.103 Courts have subsequently applied
Turner in cases challenging the constitutionality of prison policies.104
3. The Standard Can Favor Offenders: Monmouth County
Correctional Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro
The Turner standard worked in favor of inmates who
brought suit against a prison in Monmouth County State Correctional Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro and successfully
challenged a prison policy that severely restricted abortion
access.105 The Third Circuit applied the Turner standard in
Monmouth County just months after the Turner decision, and
ultimately invalidated the challenged policy.106 The case was a
class action brought by offenders challenging a prison medical
policy requiring them to obtain a court-ordered release to leave
prison to receive an elective, nontherapeutic abortion.107 Despite the fact that the lower court applied a “compelling state
interest” test instead of the Turner rationality standard, the
Third Circuit affirmed in part and modified in part the district
court’s injunctive relief.108 The Third Circuit additionally em100. Id.
101. See id.
102. Id. at 91.
103. Id. at 91, 97–100.
104. See, e.g., O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 345, 349–53
(1987) (applying Turner to reverse an appellate court decision that vacated
and remanded the district court holding of a prison regulation preventing
Muslim offenders from participating in a service central to the Islamic faith as
unconstitutional); Victoria W. v. Larpenter, 369 F.3d 475, 477, 479, 483–87
(5th Cir. 2004) (applying Turner to uphold a policy requiring a court order to
obtain temporary release for offenders seeking elective medical procedures,
including abortions); Monmouth County Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834
F.2d 326, 331–34, 338–44, 351 (3d Cir. 1987) (applying Turner to invalidate a
prison policy requiring a court-ordered release for offenders to receive nontherapeutic, elective abortions).
105. See Monmouth County, 834 F.2d at 338–44, 351.
106. See id.
107. Id. at 329, 351.
108. Id. at 330 (describing the district court’s reasoning using the compelling-state-interest standard of review); id. at 351–52 (affirming or modifying
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phasized that protection of the rights of offenders, due to the
nature of their imprisonment, can require public funds and assistance beyond what is required in the free world.109
The court considered the first element of the Turner standard of whether there was a valid connection between the regulation and a legitimate government interest.110 However, it concluded that the court-ordered-release policy failed to rationally
connect to any legitimate governmental interests.111
The Third Circuit next considered Turner’s second element
and recognized that in the unique case of abortion, “time is
likely to be of the essence.”112 Acknowledging that women, upon
the court release, “may encounter additional delays in scheduling the actual procedure,”113 the court determined that delays
due to policy roadblocks like the court-ordered release create a
variety of risks for women.114 The court noted that when time is
a central consideration and “the only means available to effectuate [the decision to abort] are laden with probable delays,
such means are inadequate and essentially deprive a woman of
the ability to exercise her constitutional right” to abortion.115
Finally, the court considered that a lack of alternative to
abortion, or, alternatively, their existence, serves to indicate
whether the regulation is reasonable.116 Considering that the
prison provided for pre- and post-natal care,117 the court concluded that funding abortions presented no significant burden
to the prison, despite the state’s asserted financial and adminall elements of the injunction, and requiring the County to arrange for transportation to and from the clinic).
109. Id. at 341 (citing Kahane v. Carlson, 527 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1975) (indicating that prison officials must accommodate prisoners with religious dietary
restrictions)); id. (“It is but just that the public be required to care for the prisoner, who cannot by reason of the deprivation of liberty, care for himself [or
herself . ]” (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976))) (internal quotations omitted).
110. Id. at 338, 338 n.19 (explaining that, because the court-order requirement centered on the nature of the treatment and not the offender’s security
status, the policy cannot be rationally related to a legitimate security interest).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 339 (quoting H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 412 (1981)).
113. Id. at 340.
114. Id. at 339.
115. Id. at 340 n.21.
116. Id. at 344.
117. Id. at 341 (“[Accommodating abortion costs] certainly imposes no
greater burdens than already exist under the County’s accepted responsibility
to provide all pregnant inmates with proper pre- and post-natal care.”).
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istrative concerns.118 The Third Circuit ultimately rejected the
District Court’s holding that the County does not need to fund
elective abortions, but explicitly notes that this does not equate
to an affirmative duty to do so.119 This marked the first successful challenge to restrictive prison abortion policies after Turner.120
The court indicated that the Turner standard should, however, be applied with leniency toward the government. According to the Third Circuit, the Turner standard is applied
“whether a challenged regulation ‘effectively prohibit[s], rather
than simply limit[s], a particular exercise of constitutional
rights.’”121 This principle is illustrated in Victoria W. v. Larpenter, where the Turner standard worked against incarcerated
women facing roadblocks to abortion.122
4. The Standard Can Work Against Offenders: Victoria W. v.
Larpenter
In Victoria W. v. Larpenter, a female offender brought a
civil rights action challenging the constitutionality of a Louisiana prison policy requiring women to obtain a court-ordered release from prison to receive an abortion.123 Meetings with administrators, filing reports, and other procedural roadblocks
prevented Victoria from receiving an abortion,124 even though
she requested the procedure immediately after discovering her
pregnancy. At the time of her release, Victoria’s pregnancy had
advanced past the point of legal abortion in Louisiana.125
The court applied the Turner standard and concluded that
the policy was reasonably related to legitimate penological interests because it was established for all elective medical procedures, not only abortion.126 The court distinguished Mon118. Id. at 341 & n.22.
119. Id. at 343.
120. Id. at 331 (describing how the Turner decision was rendered following
oral argument in Monmouth County).
121. Id. (quoting O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987)).
122. 369 F.3d 475 (5th Cir. 2004).
123. Id. at 477–78.
124. Id. at 478–80 (explaining that Victoria received prenatal care while
she attempted to fulfill requirements to meet with the Head Nurse, schedule
an abortion, meet with her lawyer, and obtain a court order).
125. Id. at 480 (“Victoria was released on October 13, 1999, too late to obtain a legal abortion in Louisiana.”).
126. Id. at 486. Among the interests asserted by the prison were prison resources, inmate security, and potential liability. Id.
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mouth County, explaining that the policy challenged there was
specific to abortion.127
These cases demonstrate that courts have used Turner to
require access to abortion and to deny it. A challenge to the
BOP abortion policies would likely follow either the Monmouth
County or Victoria W. precedent. The Third Circuit’s approach
in Monmouth County should control because the roadblocks established in the BOP policy are specific to the abortion decision
alone, and do not apply to all elective medical procedures as in
Victoria W.128
The standards set by Turner address the substantive
rights retained in prison. The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments protect both substantive rights
and the procedure for protecting these rights,129 as discussed
below.
D. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE
INCARCERATED
The doctrine of procedural due process requires that procedural safeguards be applied where deprivation of a liberty or
property right occurs.130 These safeguards are guaranteed
where codified law affirmatively protects or recognizes the existence of a right,131 but also where the Constitution protects
such rights.132
To determine whether procedural protection is due, one
must look to the “context of the inmate’s confinement.”133 Pro127. Id. at 487–88.
128. See id. at 486.
129. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 685–87 (2d
ed. 1988).
130. See Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570–71 (1972)
(finding no right to procedural due process where the interest fails to satisfy a
threshold definition of liberty or property); Philip W. Sbaratta, Note, Sandin v.
Conner: The Supreme Court’s Narrowing of Prisoners’ Due Process and the
Missed Opportunity to Discover True Liberty, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 744, 749
(1996) (describing the Roth holding as it relates to liberty and property interests).
131. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974) (describing that,
while a good-time credit is not constitutionally guaranteed, due process protection of the right to good-time credits was afforded because the state had recognized the right in legislation).
132. See Susan N. Herman, The New Liberty: The Procedural Due Process
Rights of Prisoners and Others Under the Burger Court, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 482,
491–92 (1984) (describing that interference with “life, liberty, or property”
triggers due process).
133. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 222 (1990).
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cedural protections exist where deprivation of a right is unrelated to regularly imposed penal confinement.134 By contrast,
prisons are not required to ensure procedural protections where
deprivations are “well within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a prison sentence.”135 In most cases, courts
defer to prison administrators in determining what falls within
the “context of confinement.”136
Minimum due process protection includes notice and a
hearing.137 However, “[t]he very nature of due process negates
any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to
every imaginable situation.”138 Courts have required various
combinations of an administrative hearing, timely meetings
with a warden,139 access to counsel,140 the opportunity to
present witnesses to the prison administrators,141 and the assurance of a “neutral and detached” procedural determination142 when a property or liberty interest is at stake.143
An offender is entitled to the minimum protections of notice and a judicial hearing if she can show that the right she
has been deprived of is affirmatively, statutorily, or constitutionally protected by law and that the deprivation is not within
the terms of her confinement.144 Courts may require procedure
more specific than simple notice and a hearing, however, depending on the right of which the offender has been deprived.145
134. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983).
135. Id.
136. Harper, 494 U.S. at 223–24 (“[P]rison authorities are best equipped to
make difficult decisions regarding prison administration.”).
137. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 559 (1974) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972)).
138. Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886,
895 (1961).
139. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 558.
140. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973).
141. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972).
142. Id.
143. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557 (“[The due process] analysis as to liberty
parallels the accepted due process analysis as to property.”).
144. See id. (“[A] person’s liberty is equally protected, even when the liberty itself is a statutory creation of the State.”); see also Michael Irvine, Chapter
17: Using 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to Obtain Relief from Violations of Federal Law, 31 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 305, 321 (2000) (noting
that protected liberty interests are those “that are unusually burdensome in
relation to ‘the ordinary incidents of prison life’”).
145. See, e.g., Gwinn v. Awmiller, 354 F.3d 1211, 1218–19 (2004) (holding
that an offender was entitled to notice of charges, opportunity to present witnesses and evidence in defense of those charges, and a written statement by a

1394

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[93:1377

Indeed, some liberty interests require extensive procedural protections to make them meaningful.146 Abortion rights are recognized as time sensitive147 and related to potentially injurious
procedures,148 and therefore should be eligible for heightened
procedural protection. Prison policies already provide heightened due process protections for other individual rights, such
as the First Amendment right to uncensored correspondence.
Prison correspondence procedure provides a model for prison due process protections. BOP abortion policies implicate a
liberty interest like the interest in uncensored communication
between offenders and their correspondents.149 The Constitution ensures certain protections and procedural remedies for offenders whose correspondence is kept from them150 because of
the liberty interest at stake151 and limits on the “context of . . .
confinement.”152 These protections apply to all prison policies
implicating protected constitutional rights. The BOP abortion
policies are no exception.

decision maker of evidence relied upon and reasons for classification before
being classified as a sex offender).
146. See Krug v. Lutz, 329 F.3d 692, 699 (9th Cir. 2003) (granting injunctive relief where prison correspondence was being kept from offenders); Bullock v. Barham, 23 F. Supp. 2d 883, 885 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (concluding that injunctive relief was cognizable where an offender was threatened with bodily
harm).
147. See, e.g., Monmouth County Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d
326, 339 (3d Cir. 1987) (noting the increased medical risk associated with delaying abortion).
148. There is evidence that even early abortion procedures are major medical undertakings, strongly weighing in favor of sound procedural protections
surrounding access to the procedure. See RU-486: Demonstrating a Low Standard for Women’s Health?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice,
Drug Policy, and Human Resources of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 109th
Cong. (2006).
149. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 418 (1974) (“The interest of
prisoners and their correspondents in uncensored communication by letter . . .
is plainly a ‘liberty’ interest within the meaning of the [Due Process Clause of
the] Fourteenth Amendment . . . .”).
150. Krug, 329 F.3d at 696–97 (describing that an offender must retain the
right to notice and two-level review when a prison withholds correspondence).
151. See Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
152. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 222 (1990).
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II. THE BUREAU OF PRISONS POLICY IS
UNCONSITUTIONAL AS APPLIED TO PREGNANT
OFFENDERS CONSIDERING ABORTION
The first section of Part II shows that the BOP policy is facially constitutional. The second section applies the policy to
pregnant offenders considering abortion, revealing several
flaws. The final section presents an argument that the BOP
policies, as applied to pregnant offenders, violate the constitutional right to procedural due process.
A. THE BUREAU OF PRISONS ABORTION POLICIES ARE FACIALLY
CONSTITUTIONAL
The Turner standard works in favor of the Bureau of Prisons in a facial challenge to the substantive policy. First, there
is likely a “valid, rational connection”153 between imposing security protections and effective counseling requirements and a
state interest in ensuring that offenders exercise their abortion
rights in an informed and secure manner. Second, the BOP
could argue that there is no need for “alternative means of exercising the right”154 to abortion simply because the policy, on
its face, does not prevent abortions. Third, the BOP can make a
strong case that “accommodation of the asserted constitutional
right” will have a negative impact on “guards and other inmates”155 due to personal objections to abortion, a concern expressed in the staff-exemption to the abortion policy.156 Fourth,
Turner emphasizes that prison policy addressing constitutional
issues need not be the “least restrictive alternative” available.157
Thus, under Turner, the legitimate penological interest in
security justifies regulating, but not eliminating, offenders’
access to abortion services. On its face, the policy is constitutional. How, then, is one to help women like Leisa Gibson? The
rights conferred on her were not unconstitutionally restricted
in substance, yet their exercise was prevented. This problem is
one of procedure, requiring a procedural due process analysis.

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
See id. at 90.
See id.
ABORTION AND PREGNANCY POLICY, supra note 15, at 1.
Turner, 482 U.S. at 90.
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B. APPLICATION OF THE BUREAU OF PRISON POLICIES
Applying the BOP policies to the circumstances experienced by incarcerated women like Leisa Gibson reveals six
significant problems. The policies provide no notice of options
for pregnant offenders, rely on intimidating communication
with guards, fail to incorporate time sensitivity, allow staff
nonparticipation without limitation, place responsibility in the
hands of the offender without giving her the tools to exercise
that responsibility, and allow for unnecessary and potentially
strategic time manipulation by prison officials.
First, the BOP abortion policy does not include a procedure
for alerting female offenders to the possibility they may be
pregnant, nor to the options available to them if they are.158 In
fact, Leisa Gibson was not informed of a medical appointment
scheduled for her, which was her last opportunity for an abortion.159 Without this kind of information, pregnant offenders
are left not knowing to whom to turn once they become aware
of their pregnancy.160 Weeks may pass before an offender approaches prison administrators.161
This raises the second failure of the policy’s procedures.
Moments alone with guards are likely the only means by which
to communicate a health concern.162 Indeed, Leisa Gibson was
housed in a jail guarded by U.S. Marshals, in whom she con-

158. See ABORTION AND PREGNANCY POLICY, supra note 15.
159. Gibson v. Matthews, 926 F.2d 532, 534 (6th Cir. 1991).
160. The average offender would likely be unaware of an early stage pregnancy at prison admission. The majority of female federal offenders are incarcerated for drug offenses, FACT SHEET, supra note 11, and nearly 40% of prisoners reporting a medical condition enter federal prison with a drug addiction.
MEDICAL PROBLEMS OF PRISONERS, supra note 26, tbl.7. The same number
report using drugs in a month before their arrest. Id. Drug addiction interferes
with a woman’s ability to care for her health, including monitoring her reproductive status. Women admitted to prison addicted to drugs often experience
withdrawal, which can be confused with the symptoms of early pregnancy. In
the last study performed, only 18% of female offenders receive drug treatment
in federal prisons. FACT SHEET, supra note 11. Pregnancies are only occasionally detected during physical examinations at prison admission. MEDICAL
PROBLEMS OF PRISONERS, supra note 26, tbl.8. While 78.1% of female offenders report having an obstetrics exam “since admission,” statistical reports do
not clarify the amount of time that passes from admission before an offender
receives medical care. Id. tbl.10.
161. See WATTERSON, supra note 38.
162. See http://www.bop.gov/locations/institutions/index.jsp, for a BOP description of the low staff-to-inmate ratio for a low security prison facility, indicating less contact between offenders and staff.
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fided but who failed to help her.163 Without clear guidelines of
how to obtain an abortion,164 the BOP policy relies entirely on
communication between guard and offender and the opportunity for confidential conversation as the means by which pregnant offenders are able to gain access to the abortion procedure. This reliance on confidential communication is misplaced
because offenders may fear and distrust prison guards, who
wield power over them.
Once a staff member is alerted to a suspected pregnancy,
the offender’s case manager must be notified.165 This process
may consume a significant amount of time166 because at no
point does the BOP policy dictate a time limit for involving the
case manager, arranging a medical appointment or requiring
that the abortion option be made known to the offender.167 This
is a policy failure because offenders may be unaware of their
right to terminate their pregnancy, or the amount of time it
would take to arrange the procedure from prison.
The third problem presented by the BOP policy is thus that
the offender has neither the knowledge nor tools to pressure
the prison administration to arrange for appointments and
schedule meetings with the case manager. Fourth, even when
the schedule is finally arranged, aspects of the policy allow staff
members to further delay access to abortion services. The policy
states that any staff members, including medical staff, may
refuse to participate in the care and treatment of an offender
considering abortion.168 Delays are therefore possible at both
the administrative and staff levels of the prison power structure.

163. Gibson, 926 F.2d at 534.
164. ABORTION AND PREGNANCY POLICY, supra note 15, at 2 (noting each
offender is responsible for alerting medical staff when she suspects she is
pregnant, but not specifying how to access or communicate with the appropriate administrator).
165. See id. at 3.
166. See Victoria W. v. Larpenter, 369 F.3d 475, 478–79 (5th Cir. 2004)
(noting that two weeks passed between Victoria’s request for a meeting with
the Head Nurse and the meeting).
167. See ABORTION AND PREGNANCY POLICY, supra note 15.
168. See id. at 1 (“A staff member who wishes not to be involved in arranging an elective abortion will not be required to do so.”); cf. Amy Bergquist,
Note, Pharmacist Refusals: Dispensing (With) Religious Accommodation Under Title VII, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1073, 1078 (2006) (“Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act restricts both private and public employers’ right to terminate, discipline,
or refuse to hire employees on religious grounds.”).
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The fifth problem presented by the BOP policy initially appears positive for offenders. The BOP abortion policy requires
that the offender be entirely responsible for the decision to abort her pregnancy.169 However, Leisa Gibson’s case illustrates
the damaging results of a policy which places responsibility in
the hands of the offender when she is not in a position to exercise it. The Sixth Circuit presumed that placing this responsibility in the offender’s hands removed any responsibility from
the prison administration.170 In reality, of course, with no objective information about abortion rights, no willing participation from prison administration or staff, and no understanding
of where to begin the process for obtaining an abortion, this responsibility cannot be meaningfully exercised.
Finally, the BOP policy allows for unnecessary and potentially strategic delay. This is especially the case when the warden and chaplain become involved because the BOP policy governing religious counseling encourages delay. If, and when, an
offender is made aware of her option to abort, she would likely
turn to a guard, who would notify a case manager. The case
manager would speak with the Warden.171 The BOP abortion
policy places no time restrictions on the Warden for meeting
with offenders considering abortion.172 The Warden must offer
medical, religious, and social counseling.173 The Warden will
consult with the chaplain, the coordinator of religious programming, to arrange religious counseling if requested. In addition, an offender may be transferred from facility to facility,
as Leisa Gibson was three times, “passing the buck” on to other
prisons entirely.174 Prison administrators may justify these
procedures with security and financial concerns, but the
process could, intentionally or not, delay an abortion beyond legal limits.
Access to abortion is time-sensitive. Victoria W. demonstrates that an abortion can be prevented by simply stalling the

169. See ABORTION AND PREGNANCY POLICY, supra note 15, at 3 (“[An] inmate has the responsibility to decide either to have an abortion or to bear the
child.”).
170. Gibson v. Matthews, 926 F.2d 532, 537–38 (6th Cir. 1991).
171. ABORTION AND PREGNANCY POLICY, supra note 15, at 3 (explaining
that the Warden is the primary administrator for assisting an inmate with
counseling involving abortion).
172. See id.
173. Id.
174. Gibson, 926 F.2d at 534–35.
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procedure.175 Even when prison administrators act in good
faith, as they arguably did in Victoria W.,176 it is likely that
mere bureaucracy can prevent abortion. The risk that prison
administrators will act in bad faith increases, however, where
the prison chaplain is anti-abortion and religious programming
in federal prisons is dominated by private, evangelical Christian missionary organizations. Tales of these groups’ influence
on pregnant offenders abound in Christian religious programming materials. One describes the Cinderella story of a woman
who found Christ, had a baby, and recovered from a crack addiction.177 With prison programming centered on this kind of
religiosity, and ample power placed in the hands of the persuasive chaplain, it is likely that at least some of the time consumed in implementing the policy stems from strategic manipulation of an offender’s decision.
Some pregnancies are not detected before the second or
third month (and even later for drug-addicted and unhealthy
women) and abortion is only available until the sixth month in
most clinics.178 There is a narrow opportunity for women in late
first or second trimester pregnancies to avail themselves of
abortion services. The current BOP procedure simply takes too
long, especially considering the opportunity for manipulation.
In addition, prison administrators are not required to communicate with the offender about the details of the process and her
rights, there are no procedural time constraints, and there is no
way for an offender to challenge administrative roadblocks to
abortion in time to get access to the procedure safely and legally. Although the BOP policy is substantively constitutional on
its face, its application to pregnant offenders considering abortion violates procedural due process.
C. AS APPLIED, THE BOP POLICIES FAIL TO MEET PROCEDURAL
DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS
Under the procedural due process doctrine, where there is
a right in place through statute or the Constitution, removal of
175. See Victoria W. v. Larpenter, 369 F.3d 475, 478 (5th Cir. 2004).
176. See id. at 490 (“[P]rison officials and medical staff reasonably applied
the policy.”).
177. Hope Today Prison Fellowship, Redeemed Drug Addict Returns to Jail
to Spread the Word, HOPE TODAY: STORIES OF TRANSFORMATION,
http://www.pfm.org/article.asp?ID=491 (last visited Mar. 9, 2009).
178. See Patricia Miller, The Last Resort: Abortion Providers in Kansas and
Mississippi Hold Ground Despite States’ Attacks, MS., Fall 2005, at 16, (noting
that only two clinics in the country perform late-term abortions).
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that right must be accompanied by procedural accommodations.179 The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments protect the right to choose abortion, and the BOP
policy also explicitly codifies it.180 While this recognition of the
right renders the policy facially constitutional, this recognition
of the offender’s constitutional liberty interest places it squarely within the realm of procedural due process. Regardless of the
BOP’s ability to limit rights in the prison context based on legitimate interests,181 the prison must provide offenders with procedural protections.182
Furthermore, the “context of confinement” analysis shows
that removal of the right to choose abortion must be accompanied by procedural due process protection.183 Removal of a right
is in the “context of the inmate’s confinement” where deprivation of the right is related to regularly imposed penal confinement.184 Challenges to prison policies under this standard
usually address punishments added to a prison sentence, like
solitary confinement or removal of prison privileges.185 These
punishments are within the context of confinement because
they can be expected in an ordinary prison sentence. However,
mandatory childbirth is not within an expected prison sentence.186 Even with deference to prison administrators,187
forced childbirth cannot be construed as lawful punishment.188
179. See Herman, supra note 132, at 491–92.
180. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973); ABORTION AND PREGNANCY
POLICY, supra note 15, at 1, 3; RELIGION POLICY, supra note 15, at 8.
181. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (concluding that a regulation is valid even if it impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, if it is “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests”).
182. See Monmouth County Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326,
341 (3d Cir. 1987) (explaining that the state must provide certain resources for
offenders in order to ensure the safe exercise of their constitutional rights,
such as particular foods for religious purposes); Stanford H. Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudications—A Survey and Criticism, 66
YALE L.J. 319, 340 (1957) (explaining that procedural safeguards are important “even in an area of legitimate governmental concern”).
183. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 222 (1990).
184. Id. at 220.
185. See Whitlock v. Johnson, 982 F. Supp. 615, 617–18 (N.D. Ill 1997)
(upholding a procedural due process challenge against a disciplinary hearing);
Irvine, supra note 144, at 321.
186. Elizabeth Budnitz, Not a Part of Her Sentence: Applying the Supreme
Court’s Johnson v. California to Prison Abortion Policies, 71 BROOK. L. REV.
1291, 1302 (2006) (describing the physical burden of carrying an unwanted
pregnancy in prison).
187. See Harper, 494 U.S. at 224.
188. See John F. Hagan, Jail OKs Altered Abortion Policy; Settlement In-

2009]

PRISON ABORTION POLICY

1401

In fact, scholars argue that forced childbearing in prison
amounts to cruel and unusual punishment, violating the
Eighth Amendment.189 Procedural protections are warranted
because abortion rights are statutorily and constitutionally recognized and removing them is not traditionally acceptable
criminal punishment.
In Monmouth County,190 the Third Circuit reviewed the affirmative obligation of the state to provide resources for offenders to adequately exercise the rights they retained in prison.191
The court emphasized that the protection provided in the free
world must be heightened in the prison context because offenders are totally dependent on the state.192 Monmouth County
urges a comparison of free world standards to the needs of offenders in order to determine the constitutional adequacy of
prison policies.193 This principle is particularly applicable to determine the adequacy of current BOP procedure vis-à-vis abortion.
Outside the prison context, Casey would determine that
unidentified time constraints and religious coercion with no
access to other resources amount to an undue burden on a
woman’s right to choose abortion.194 The obstacles established
in the BOP abortion policies are comparable to the spousal noti-

cludes Payment to Woman Jailed by Former Judge, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), June 4, 2002, at B1 (describing the six-month suspension of a judge for
allegedly jailing a female defendant after learning about her desire to seek
abortion). But see People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 364 (Cal. Ct. App.
1984) (affirming the parole condition that a woman convicted of child endangerment not conceive any more children because the condition was “related to
child endangerment, the crime for which [the] appellant was convicted”).
189. Budnitz, supra note 186, at 1321−22; Egerman, supra note 31, at 437
(arguing that forced childbirth “represents a serious violation of basic human
dignity in direct violation of the Eighth Amendment”); Tecla Morasca, Involuntary Childbirth and Prisoners’ Rights: Court-Order Prison Policy Violates
Fundamental Rights, 32 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 69–73.
190. Monmouth County Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 341
(3d Cir. 1987).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 341−42 (describing a prison’s obligation to accommodate religious diet, feed, clothe, and house offenders).
193. Id. at 341 (“Automatically applying in the prison context the tenets
that define the government’s obligation to its free world citizens denies . . .
inmates’ right to have their constitutional claims balanced against the state’s
legitimate interests in operating its prisons.”).
194. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 898 (1992)
(striking down spousal-notification provision because of the “troubling degree
of authority” it gave to a husband over his wife).
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fication provision invalidated in Casey.195 The Court invalidated this provision because it placed a “troubling degree of authority”196 in the hands of someone other than the woman making the choice,197 a person whose intentions might not be in her
best interest.198 The BOP policy mimics this problem by placing
ultimate control over the abortion decision in the hands of prison administrators, not the offender herself.199 Like the concerns
with spousal consent, the interests of prison administrators
may not align with those of pregnant offenders.200 The BOP policies, like the free-world spousal consent provision,201 place an
undue burden on the woman’s decision to choose abortion in
prison.
One could argue that the Casey standard should not be
considered when analyzing rights in the prison context.202 After
all, Turner specifically indicates that a less rigid standard applies when substantive rights are at issue in prison.203 However, Monmouth County indicates that if a policy would be overly
burdensome in the free world, it certainly cannot work in the
prison context where the right is retained.204 Under Monmouth
County, the prison must provide the means to ensure that
access to retained rights is protected and meaningful. The Gibson court recognized this fact when it stated that Monmouth
County “implicitly extended to prisoners a right not to be prevented from having an abortion because of their incarcerated
status.”205 Casey re-framed the issue of abortion as a debate
about the manageability of hurdles and roadblocks. In light of
195. Id. at 887–99.
196. Id. at 898.
197. See id. at 896 (“The Constitution protects individuals, men and women
alike, from unjustified state interference, even when that interference is
enacted into law for the benefit of their spouses.”).
198. See id. at 893 (listing the myriad reasons a woman would be afraid to
tell her husband her desire to seek abortion).
199. But see ABORTION AND PREGNANCY POLICY, supra note 15, at 3 (“[T]he
inmate has the responsibility to decide either to abort or bear the child.”).
200. See Monmouth County Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326,
336–38 (3d Cir. 1987) (describing the state’s interests and weighing them
against the offenders’ interests).
201. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 898.
202. But see Budnitz, supra note 186, at 1294−95 (arguing that Johnson v.
California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005), supports the proposition that courts reviewing
prison abortion policies should apply intermediate scrutiny in accordance with
Casey instead of Turner).
203. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
204. Monmouth County, 834 F.2d at 341.
205. Gibson v. Matthews, 926 F.2d 532, 535 (6th Cir. 1991).
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this modern construction of abortion rights in Casey, the Monmouth County approach to prison abortion should be applied,
and the Victoria W. approach should be rejected. Under the
Monmouth County standard, the BOP policy has failed to provide adequate procedures by which offenders may exercise their
retained rights to choose abortion and challenge potential restrictions thereto.
Perhaps indicative of the social marginalization of female
prisoners, there is little awareness of this problem. Outside the
sparse litigation that has taken place challenging state prison
policies, no person or organization has taken direct action
against prisons that limit female offenders’ access to abortion.
None of the major pro-choice advocacy groups include discussions of the issue on their websites or in printed promotional
material. Still, potentially thousands of women continue to suffer in silence.206 As the population of women in prison increases, the risk of constitutional violations also increases.
In order to avoid the detrimental impact of these policies
on individual prisoners, this Note offers a workable solution to
amend the BOP policies. While the abortion issue is controversial, access to the procedure continues to be protected by the
Constitution.207 As long as this is the case, solutions are required to clear bureaucratic barriers to access. The traditional
procedural protections of timely notice and a hearing are required to prevent abuses of policy and procedural roadblocks.
III. AMENDING THE BUREAU OF PRISONS POLICIES TO
CONFORM TO THE CONSTITUTION
Changes in policy are required for the BOP abortion policies to provide adequate procedural due process. Policy must
provide timely notice and the opportunity for a hearing to offenders who are deprived of access to abortion services. These
procedural protections are included in BOP policy governing offender correspondence.208 That policy provides a model for
change to the abortion policy. The addition of a time limit, no206. See MEDICAL PROBLEMS OF PRISONERS, supra note 26, tbl.10; Quick
Facts About the Federal Bureau of Prisons, http://www.bop.gov/news/quick.jsp
(last visited Mar. 9, 2009) (indicating that 13,273 women are incarcerated in
federal prisons).
207. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992).
208. FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, PROGRAM STATEMENT, CORRESPONDENCE, available at http://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5265_011.pdf [hereinafter CORRESPONDENCE POLICY].
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tice requirements, and opportunities for appeal and review will
bring the BOP abortion policy into conformity with the Constitution. These changes would be easy and inexpensive to implement because structural protections of similar rights already
exist in the federal prison system.209
A. THE REQUIREMENT OF TIMELY NOTICE PROTECTS TIMESENSITIVE ABORTION RIGHTS
In order to meet the timely notice requirement, the BOP
abortion policy must recognize the time-sensitive nature of
abortion procedures.210 Failure to respond to requests for abortion during the early stages of an offender’s pregnancy jeopardizes the affirmatively granted right to choose abortion, either
by inadvertent failure to accelerate the process or manipulation
by prison staff.211 The BOP must notify the offender of her right
to choose abortion, the procedure for obtaining an abortion, and
any delays potentially arising in the process.
The BOP policy relating to offender correspondence provides an element of time sensitivity. First, the correspondence
policy requires that offenders receive notification of rules relating to their right to private correspondence immediately upon
entering a federal facility.212 Second, the correspondence policy
requires frequent internal review of decisions by prison administrators to limit an offender’s right to correspondence.213
The BOP abortion policy does not recognize the time sensitivity of threatened rights, although access to an abortion is arguably more time-sensitive than access to one’s letters and
magazines. Correspondence access is reviewed every 180
days.214 An identical review, described in the following section,
of an offender’s requests related to pregnancy should be re209. Id. at 6–8 (explaining the procedures for limiting correspondences and
providing standard notice and consent forms for offenders).
210. See Monmouth County Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326,
339 (3d Cir. 1987).
211. See, e.g., Reproductive Rights in Prison, Posting to Reproductive
Rights Prof Blog, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/reproductive_rights/2007/
02/reproductive_ri.html (Feb. 1, 2007) (“[A] worker at the jail refused to give
the woman her second dose of emergency contraception to help prevent a possible pregnancy from [her rape by a prison guard], because he objected to the
medication on religious grounds.”).
212. CORRESPONDENCE POLICY, supra note 208, at 6.
213. Id. at 18 (“The Warden shall review an inmate’s restricted special
mail status at least once every 180 days.”).
214. Id.
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quired every fourteen days to ensure that the review operates
within the time constraints of abortion access. These frequent
procedural reviews would not violate the Turner standard because they are already incorporated in prison procedure, daily
operations, and costs as they relate to correspondence.
The policy must also limit prison administrators to a reasonable time for arranging an abortion for offenders. Injecting
time sensitivity into the policy allows an offender to have an
abortion quickly and provides effective monitoring to prevent
strategic delay of the process. Recognition of the time-sensitive
nature of the right to abortion, paired with notice of that right,
and the chance it may be obstructed, would allow an offender to
understand the options available to her. This change could be
implemented by requiring that the procedure be performed
within one month after the offender requests an abortion.
Notice of one’s rights and the procedures for exercising
them are also lacking in the BOP abortion policy. Once again,
the BOP correspondence policy provides a model.215 The first
paragraph of the policy requires that the guidelines themselves
“be widely available to staff and inmates through posting on
bulletin boards, placement in the institution library, or other
appropriate means.”216 The BOP ensures that offenders have
access to information about their right to correspond by posting
the policy itself throughout the prison. A similar requirement of
posting notices in prison locker rooms or restrooms would inform offenders of their right to abortion and of the process for
obtaining the procedure. These changes could be easily implemented using the same infrastructure that implements the correspondence policy.
The correspondence policy also includes specific language
for notifying offenders before restricting their right to correspond. The policy requires prison staff to inform offenders of the
possibility that their right will be limited,217 and when the right
is limited, notice must be given describing the reasons for the
limitation and the options for redress.218 The right to abortion,
and the limitations on it, would be clearer and better communicated if the BOP abortion policy included identical requirements for communication to offenders. After an offender requests an abortion, prison administrators should have to
215.
216.
217.
218.

See id. at 6.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 8, 13.
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provide her with a comprehensive description of the process
from beginning to end, either during a hearing or in writing.
This clear communication would enable offenders to prepare
and plan for abortion. It would also diminish the likelihood that
abuse of the policy would go unchecked.
For example, the requirement of religious counseling severely restricts an offender’s access to abortion. Adding the
elements of time and notice to the abortion policy would allow
an offender to schedule counseling with the chaplain in advance of her decision, or to request an outside counselor of her
choice without running out of time for an abortion. Because the
offender would be notified of the requirement earlier and the
administration would be required to arrange counseling within
a time that does not restrict the right to access abortion, offenders would be better able to get meaningful counseling.
The time and notice requirements may result, however, in
some pregnant offenders not receiving religious counseling due
to constraints on administrator’s time for planning the procedure. In anticipation of these circumstances, the BOP should
develop an expedited background check policy for outside counselors with less stringent security restrictions for pregnant offenders considering abortion in order to enable these women to
get access to meaningful counseling with a counselor of their
denomination.219 The offender could receive counseling pertinent to her faith at the most useful time, when she is still capable of having an abortion. An offender should be notified of
this expedited process only when she reveals her pregnancy.
This would minimize any security threat posed by offenders’
meeting using expedited background checks for visits when
they are not actually in need of pregnancy counseling.220
B. THE REQUIREMENT OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING
PREVENTS POTENTIAL COERCION
After notifying an offender of her right to abortion, the
process involved, and her access to religious counseling, the
BOP policy must afford basic hearings for offenders requesting
219. See RELIGION POLICY, supra note 15, at 16.
220. Security restrictions for female offenders are already limited. See Federal Bureau of Prisons, Institutions Housing Female Offenders, http://www
.bop.gov/locations/female_facilities.jsp (last visited Mar. 9, 2009); Federal Bureau of Prisons, Prison Types & General Information, http://www.bop.gov/
locations/institutions/index.jsp (last visited Mar. 9, 2009) (describing the characteristics of minimum- and low-security facilities, including the absence of
perimeter fences in some minimum security prisons).
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changes in policy or assistance in exercising the right to choose
abortion. Administrative review is a procedural safeguard required by the Due Process Clause that would accommodate
such requests. Administrative review calls for, at a minimum,
two-person review of restrictions placed on protected rights.221
In the case of prison correspondence, courts require that
prison policy involve an unbiased two-person review of a decision to censure correspondence.222 The BOP correspondence
policy includes specific language required for notifying offenders of their right to written and oral appeal of a restriction of
their right.223 Similarly, administrative review must be established to review a complaint in the event an offender challenges
abortion policy after receiving notice. A review by two disinterested persons would be beneficial to offenders because it would
likely reveal any staff attempts to undermine the process. The
review is also an opportunity to evaluate the pregnant offender’s situation and allow advocacy on the part of one or both reviewers to hasten the process. A hearing would also provide offenders with a forum to request a meeting with a specific
counselor, or one other than the chaplain, in order to access
personalized religious counseling. Like notice of the rights involved, access to administrative review must be timely in order
to conform to the requirements of due process. Implementation
of this change to the BOP abortion policy would also be fairly
simple; the two-person review panels meet to review complaints on a regular basis and the complaint procedure is already available for other aspects of prison policy.
These hearings must consider injunctive relief as a remedy
to give female offenders access to abortion services. Although it
is not a foundational procedural due process guarantee, injunctive relief is necessary because the BOP policy implicates a protected right, abortion access, that is time-sensitive. In addition,
removing the right to abortion causes bodily harm because the
alternative is childbirth, which is a physical ordeal for all wom-

221. Krug v. Lutz, 329 F.3d 692, 697−98 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining that
state must provide review by two people, one of whom is not involved in denying the right, before it can deny a constitutional right to an offender).
222. Id.; see also CORRESPONDENCE POLICY, supra note 208, at 8 (“The
Warden shall refer an appeal to an official other than the one who originally
disapproved the correspondence.”).
223. CORRESPONDENCE POLICY, supra note 208, at 8, 13.
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en,224 regardless of their interest in abortion. In addition, this
kind of relief has been granted in other prison cases,225 including abortion.226 For example, one of the rare stories of prison
abortion that has been made public describes the story of “Jane
Doe,” a minor who was forced to continue her pregnancy because her sentencing judge would not to allow her to leave her
residential treatment facility for an abortion.227 “Jane” was ultimately granted injunctive relief by a different judge.228 The
relief required the facility to inform women of their right to
choose abortion and the procedures required to obtain the service.229
To avoid the physical burden of an advancing pregnancy,
an offender is entitled to an expedited administrative hearing
that considers injunctive relief.230 Injunctive relief should be
the primary administrative remedy available to a pregnant offender challenging BOP policies preventing her from accessing
abortion, including the BOP religious counseling policy. These
challenges would allow an offender to circumvent religious
counseling if time constrains her access to a counselor of her
denomination.
Timely notice to offenders of the right to choose abortion
while in prison and the procedure for doing so, as well as administrative hearings to review cases, would improve the BOP
abortion policy. In addition, the BOP policies must provide offenders with access to two person hearings which rule on injunctive relief and access to expedited screening of religious
counselors arranged for or requested by pregnant offenders.
These solutions would alleviate the insurmountable burdens
that the current BOP abortion policy imposes on pregnant
women.

224. The physical risks associated with pregnancy increase substantially
when a pregnant woman is incarcerated. See Egerman, supra note 31, at 434–
36.
225. See Krug, 329 F.3d at 699; Bullock v. Barham, 23 F. Supp. 2d 883, 885
(1998).
226. See Rachel Roth, Searching for the State: Who Governs Prisoners’ Reproductive Rights?, 11 SOC. POL. 411, 412 (2004).
227. Id.
228. Id. at 412 n.1.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 412 (describing a judge’s decision to hold an emergency hearing
to determine the value of Jane’s claim for injunctive relief because no remedy
at law could prevent the health risks a delay to abortion presented).
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CONCLUSION
Leisa Gibson spent the duration of her pregnancy in federal prison, being systematically ignored and misled by prison
administrators.231 She was forced to carry her unwanted pregnancy to term and ultimately to give birth in prison.232 The
BOP policy enabled prison officials to “pass[ ] the buck,”233 leaving Leisa a “victim of the bureaucracy as a whole.”234 Furthermore, there were no remedies available for Leisa to recover her
losses from the prison officials who caused them by preventing
her from having an abortion.235 This Note presents a different
way of looking at this problem: as one of procedural, not substantive, rights.
Indeed, the BOP policies surrounding prison abortion are
facially constitutional but unconstitutional as applied to women
like Leisa because they fail to provide adequate procedural due
process. The number of women in federal and state institutions
has increased at almost twice the rate of incarcerated men for
over ten years.236 Given the growing number of female offenders, the impact of these damaging policies is significant. There
are more women like Leisa Gibson.
About three percent of female federal inmates report being
pregnant at the time of their incarceration.237 This number will
grow as the incarcerated female population grows. It is a population comprised of women with financial, social, and behavioral problems that make abortion a valued option. Indeed, “[f]ar
from being criminal predators, female inmates tend to be impoverished, drug addicts, victims of sexual assault or domestic violence, and mothers.”238 The unique experiences of female offenders require adequate procedural protections to preserve the
rights of this growing population.

231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

Gibson v. Matthews, 926 F.2d 532, 534–35 (6th Cir. 1991).
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Id. at 534–35.
Id. at 536, 538.
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